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The current state, problems and future 
of Germany’s air and missile defence
Justyna Gotkowska
From German point of view, air and missile defence systems are of little relevance for the 
protection of Germany’s territory. However, they are seen as important for conducting ‘out of 
area’ operations, providing military assistance to allies, and for Germany’s political and mili-
tary-technical position within NATO. The Bundeswehr has been modernising its air and missile 
defence systems for several years. The modernisation of very short-range and short-range 
systems is slightly behind schedule. Plans to modernise the medium-range air and missile 
defence have been encountering problems since the United States decided to refrain from 
buying the jointly developed MEADS system. Therefore Germany is currently considering us-
ing the results of the MEADS program in the development of its own medium-range air and 
missile defence system, possibly in co-operation with France and Italy. Such a system would 
ensure protection against short-range ballistic missiles (up to 1000 km) and might become 
part of NATO’s ballistic missile defence, replacing the Patriot batteries which Germany is cur-
rently operating. Furthermore, Germany could expand its involvement in NATO’s ballistic mis-
sile defence in the future by buying or developing system to intercept medium- and interme-
diate-range ballistic missiles (up to 3000 km and 5500 km). The final decision on this matter 
has not yet been taken, and will be left for the successive governments of Germany to resolve. 
It will depend on a number of political, military and financial factors. 
Risks, threats and air & missile defence 
from Germany’s perspective
Germany perceives a direct territorial threat in-
volving conventional military means as an un-
likely event today and in the foreseeable future. 
Germany does not rule out however crises or 
conflicts on NATO’s borders, which could require 
Germany to provide assistance to other NATO 
member states under Article 5 of the North At-
lantic Treaty. Nonetheless, Germany is primarily 
focused on non-military risks and threats to its 
security posed by failing and failed states, the 
collapses of authoritarian regimes, internation-
al terrorism, the activities of criminal networks, 
natural and climate disasters, epidemics, surges 
in migration, or shortages in supplies of natural 
resources and raw materials. According to offi-
cial documents, crises and conflicts caused by 
such phenomena may affect Germany’s security 
in its broader sense. They may thus create rea-
sons for the government to deploy the Bundes- 
wehr on NATO, EU or UN operations. 
Taking into consideration Germany’s perception 
of threats, air and missile defence systems are 
considered to be of little relevance for the de-
fence of Germany’s territory. Germany sees 
no risk of a conventional attack, or of an attack 
using short-range ballistic missiles (up to 1000 
km – Russia is not regarded as a potential en-
emy), or even medium-range ballistic missiles 
(up to 3000 km – according to Luftwaffe of-
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ficials, no potential enemy possesses such ca-
pabilities, although some might acquire them 
in the future)1. This reasoning is also reflected 
in the document of the Federal Ministry of De-
fence from 2010 concerning proposed savings 
on armament and military equipment. The 
document concludes that the surface-to-air de-
fence systems are of little importance for Ger-
many with regard to the defence of German 
territory alone2. 
Germany believes however that air and mis-
sile defence capabilities are important for 
conducting ‘out of area’ operations. Air and 
missile defence systems may be used for the 
protection of facilities and of German or al-
lied mobile forces. They should counter a wide 
range of symmetric and asymmetric threats: 
from multi-role combat aircraft, helicopters, 
UAVs, to cruise missiles, rocket, artillery and 
mortar shells or even short-range ballistic mis-
siles (up to 1000 km)3. 
Moreover, Germany perceives air and mis-
sile defence capabilities as important in the 
NATO context. Firstly, Germany is aware of 
the risks posed by instability in the Middle East 
(such as the war in Syria) to the southern pe-
ripheries of NATO. Germany is thus considering 
providing military assistance to southern NATO 
members, as demonstrated by German involve-
ment in Operation Active Fence in Turkey (two 
Patriot batteries). However, there has been no 
German discussion of the possibility of crises in 
Northern or Central and Eastern Europe involv-
ing the use of military force. Secondly, air and 
missile defence capabilities are being consid-
ered in the context of Germany’s political and 
military-technical position and influence within 
NATO. The Bundeswehr and the Federal Min-
1 See statements by General Dieter Naskrent, Deputy In-
spector of the Luftwaffe, Zukünftige Bedeutung der 
deutschen bodengebundenen Luftverteidigung, 26 No-
vember 2012, http://www.idlw.de/index.php/aktuelles-idl-
w/390-zukuenftige-bedeutung-der-deutschen-bodenge-
bundenen-luftverteidigung 
2 Federal Ministry of Defence, Priorisierung Materialinves-
titionen, Handlungsempfehlungen, 25 June 2010.
3 Helge Weymann, Die Neuausrichtung der bodengebun-
denen Luftverteidigung, 6 December 2012, www.luft-
waffe.de 
istry of Defence believe that missile defence is 
gaining particular significance in the wake of 
NATO’s 2010 decision to develop a ballistic mis-
sile defence capability.4 It is being developed 
on the basis of the US European Phased Adap-
tive Approach (EPAA, which includes the land-
based SM-3 interceptor sites in Poland and Ro-
mania), and will be expanded by incorporating 
the missile defence systems of NATO’s Europe-
an members. Therefore, according to the Bun-
deswehr and the MoD, Germany’s contribution 
to NATINAMDS, NATO’s future Integrated Air 
and Missile Defence System, should correspond 
to German position as one of the Alliance’s 
largest member states. From a military-techni-
cal point of view, Germany is aware that if it 
made no national contribution to the system, 
German companies would largely be exclud-
ed from air and missile defence development 
projects in Europe, and in the future Germany 
might become dependent on its allies in both 
the military and industrial dimensions. 
The Bundeswehr is also developing air and 
missile defence systems in the context of the 
Breite vor Tiefe capabilities development 
concept. Since future risks and threats are un-
predictable, the German Armed Forces should 
maintain and develop a wide range of capabil-
ities, even on a small scale, so that they can be 
gradually expanded if needed.5
4 The German Air Force is responsible for the entire air 
and missile defence in the current structure of the Bun-
deswehr, having taken over the Army’s tasks related to 
very short-range and short-range air defence in the af-
termath of the 2011 reform. 
5 Justyna Gotkowska, Bundeswehr 3.0. The political, mili-
tary and social dimensions of the reform of the German 
armed forces, Policy Briefs 28, May 2012, http://www.
osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/PW_28_EN.pdf  
Air and missile defence capabilities are 
being considered in the context of Ger-
many’s political and military-technical 
position and influence within NATO.
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German plans regarding air and missile 
defence
For several years, the Bundeswehr has been up-
grading its very short-range, short-range and 
medium-range surface-to-air defence systems. 
This is related to the fact that some systems have 
been decommissioned, and others will be put 
out of service within a few years. In accordance 
with the original plans, a comprehensive mod-
ernisation of the entire air defence architecture 
should have been completed by around 2020. 
(1) Very short-range (VSHORAD) and short-
range (SHORAD) air defence. As the systems 
currently in use are being gradually decommis-
sioned (Roland in 2005, Gepard in 2010 and 
Ozelot/Stinger around 2018), a decision was 
taken in 2007 to develop a completely new ar-
chitecture for very short-range and short-range 
air defence, the so-called System Flugabwehr 
(SysFla). The SysFla concept originated mainly 
from analyses of the current and future ‘air’ 
threats faced by German military units partic-
ipating in foreign missions. The experience of 
the mission in Afghanistan was the main source 
of guidance in this regard. The original plan 
was for SysFla to be developed in three phases, 
and the system was intended to ultimately pro-
vide protection for stationary facilities, theatre 
of operations, and mobile forces against a wide 
range of symmetric and asymmetric threats.6 
Since 2008, German arms companies have been 
in charge of the development of SysFla; it is be-
ing developed by a joint venture of Rheinmetall 
Defence and MBDA Deutschland in co-opera-
6 Rheinmetall Defence, SysFla / LFK NG – the air defence 
system of the future, 8 June 2010, http://www.rhein-
metall-defence.com/de/rheinmetall_defence/public_re-
lations/news/detail_1426.php 
tion with Diehl BGT Defence and Kraus-Maffei 
Wegmann. 
The objective of the first phase of the SysFla 
project was to create a stationary system that 
could counter asymmetric threats (RAM, i.e. 
low-calibre rockets, artillery and mortar shells) 
and symmetric threats (aircraft, helicopters, 
UAVs or even cruise missiles), and could pri-
marily be used for the defence of military bas-
es during foreign operations. The first phase 
of the project has been partially completed. In 
its current version, the stationary MANTIS sys-
tem serves mainly to counter RAM shells within 
a range of 500 metres to 3 kilometres. The Bun-
deswehr received two such systems in the au-
tumn of 2012 (and plans to acquire two more). 
However, it has not decided to use them in Af-
ghanistan for the protection of the Kunduz base 
because of the downsizing of the German con-
tingent. In accordance with the SysFla concept, 
the MANTIS system will also be equipped with 
LFK NG launcher/missile to counter aircraft, hel-
icopters, UAVs and even cruise missiles within 
a range of up to 10 km and at altitudes of up 
to 5 km.7 The LFK NG launcher/missile and its 
integration into the MANTIS system are still in 
development. In the second and third phases of 
the SysFla project, the whole system is expect-
ed to attain better target detection capability, 
become mobile and be adapted to protecting 
mobile forces. A mobile platform will be devel-
oped which will be integrated with a C-RAM 
cannon, and probably an LFK NG launcher8. 
(2) Medium-range air defence (MRAD). Cur-
rently the Bundeswehr is equipped with Patriot 
surface-to-air missile batteries that were or-
dered before the end of the Cold War and have 
been in service since 1989. The medium-range 
Patriot system serves to protect theatre of op-
7 Rheinmetall Defence, System Flugabwehr (SysFla) – 
Schutz im Einsatz, February 2010, http://www.rhein-
metall-defence.com/de/rheinmetall_defence/public_re-
lations/current_topic/archive/details_1580.php 
8 Is Germany Losing Its Air-Defence Capability?, 
21.12.2009, www.defpro.com; Luftwaffe, Das Nächst-
bereich-Schutzsystem Mantis, www.luftwaffe.de; Ulrich 
Rapreger, MANTIS übergeben und einsatzbereit, Eu-
ropäische Sicherheit & Technik, January 2013, p. 44-45.
A decision was taken in 2007 to develop 
a completely new architecture for very 
short-range and short-range air defence.
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erations, troops, military bases and population 
centres. Over the last twenty years, some of 
the German Patriot batteries have been grad-
ually decommissioned, while others have been 
upgraded. Since early 2013, the Luftwaffe has 
been operating twelve Patriot batteries (with 
additional two batteries for training) with PAC-3 
upgrade. The batteries have dual capabilities 
for air defence to counter aircraft, helicopters 
and UAVs within a range of 68 km (PAC-2 mis-
siles), and for missile defence to intercept short-
range ballistic missiles (up to 1000 km) within 
a range of around 15–45 km9 (PAC-3 CRI mis-
siles) at altitudes of up to 20 km. However, as 
the economic viability of Germany’s Patriot bat-
teries and their upgrade potential are diminish-
ing, they were planned to be decommissioned 
between 2020 and 2025.10 In view of the need 
to replace the Patriot system, Germany, togeth-
er with the USA and Italy, launched a project in 
2005 to develop the MEADS medium-range air 
and missile defence system (Medium Extended 
Air Defence System). The MEADS system was 
expected to offer better target detection and 
interception capability, wider range, more in-
teroperability and better transport and mobility 
capability (see Appendix). German Patriot bat-
teries were expected to be gradually replaced 
by eight MEADS batteries from 2018. Addition-
ally, German companies have been developing 
IRIS-T SL air defence system to be integrated 
with MEADS system for service in the Bundes- 
wehr. IRIS-T SL was intended to counter less de-
manding targets such as aircraft, helicopters, 
UAVs and air-to-surface missiles within a range 
of 25 km, the objective being to reduce the cost 
of operating the MEADS system with the ex-
pensive PAC-3 missiles.
9 Bundeswehr, PATRIOT aktuell, www.luftwaffe.de; Jerry 
Sommer, Streitpunkt. Raketenabwehr in Europa, Febru-
ary 2012, http://www.paulschaefer.info/fileadmin/lcmss-
chaefer/download/1202_raketenabwehr.pdf, p. 10.
10 Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der 
FDP, Konzept der Bundesregierung zur Flugabwehr und 
Luftverteidigung, Drucksache 16/13752, 07.07.2009, 
http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/137/1613752.
pdf 
However, in February 2011, President Barack 
Obama announced that the US would withdraw 
from the MEADS program and not buy the fu-
ture system, officially for financial reasons.11 
That decision prompted Germany to announce 
that it would not buy the MEADS system either. 
Without the USA, which had been expected to 
buy the largest number of batteries, their pur-
chase became too expensive for the European 
partners. However, the USA has agreed (prob-
ably under pressure from Germany and Italy) 
to participate in the research and development 
phase of MEADS program until its planned 
completion in 2014. This would imply the crea-
tion of a system prototype whose effectiveness 
would be proved in two intercept flight tests. 
Although the US Congress and Senate initially 
refused to grant financing for the final year of 
the MEADS research and development phase, 
ultimately the program will receive funding and 
will be completed. The decisive factors in this 
move have been the support of the Obama ad-
ministration and the threats by Germany and 
Italy that they would demand compensation 
for the interruption of the joint program.12
11 Apart from the reasons related to spending cuts, the de-
cision was probably also influenced by pressure from the 
US arms industry, which is reluctant to transfer technol-
ogies to European companies, and the US Army, which 
prefers to retain full control over newly developed tech-
nologies. 
12 Reuters, Stop-gap spending measure funds MEADS mis-
sile defense, 25 March 2013, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/25/us-lock-
heed-missiles-idUSBRE92O02F20130325 
Germany, together with the USA and Italy, 
launched a project in 2005 to develop the 
MEADS medium-range air and missile 
defence system.
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Problems and development prospects
The spending cuts and the problems with the 
MEADS program have forced Germany to revise 
its original plans for developing its air defence 
architecture. In 2011, the German Air Force for-
mulated a new air defence concept (Luftvertei-
digungsverbund 2020) and presented it to the 
Federal Ministry of Defence.13 The concept has 
probably not been approved yet, and is not 
available through open sources; however, some 
conclusions about it can be drawn from state-
ments by Bundeswehr and MoD’s officials and 
press reports. 
(1) Very short-range and short-range air de-
fence. The Bundeswehr will upgrade and buy 
successive elements of the SysFla project de-
pending on its financial situation. It is expect-
ed to go ahead with the planned purchase of 
two more MANTIS systems, and to integrate it 
with LFK NG launcher/missile, although the ac-
quisition of mobile elements of the system may 
be postponed. There is a strong economic and 
industrial case (which is at least as important 
as the military considerations) for purchasing 
all the projected SysFla elements. The exten-
sive involvement of German companies in its 
development allows to maintain and develop 
technologies and production capacity in Ger-
many, which in the future may open export 
opportunities. However, the sense of acquiring 
successive SysFla elements may be challenged 
by politicians, especially the opposition. SysFla 
is being developed on the basis of scenarios 
involving high-intensity conflicts such as the 
mission in Afghanistan, yet in the short and 
medium term, the Bundeswehr is unlikely to 
take part in foreign operations of this kind. The 
German Armed Forces have been consistently 
developing their expeditionary capabilities, and 
previous and current defence ministers have 
argued for greater Bundeswehr involvement 
13 Helge Weymann, Die Neuausrichtung der bodengebun-
denen Luftverteidigung, Luftwaffe, 6 December 2012, 
www.luftwaffe.de 
in foreign missions. However, the recent deci-
sions by the German government concerning 
(minimal or no) military involvement in the 
conflicts in Libya and Mali, and the critical at-
titude of the majority of the political elite and 
public opinion towards the rationality and ef-
fectiveness of NATO/EU military involvement, 
are evidence of an opposite tendency. For this 
reason, the Bundeswehr is expected to use its 
expeditionary capabilities in future crisis man-
agement operations to only a limited extent. 
The case for acquiring all the SysFla elements 
could be strengthened by arguing that they 
might also be used domestically, e.g. for protect-
ing important public events in Germany – this is 
an argument that German defence companies 
in particular could find useful to raise. 
(2) Medium-range air defence. After the 
United States decided in February 2011 not 
to buy the MEADS system, Germany modified 
its plans concerning the modernisation of its 
medium-range air and missile defence system. 
Germany currently does not plan to buy the 
MEADS system, but to use the results of the 
program along with German technological po-
tential to build a national system that will also 
include some ‘European’ elements.14 The Ger-
mans assume that they will be able to mod-
ernise their medium-range air defence using 
some key elements of the MEADS prototype, 
such as the BMC4I Tactical Operation Center, 
the Multifunction Fire Control Radar (MFCR) 
and the Launcher, with the latter two provid-
ing 360-degree defence. Information provid-
14 Interview with Lieutenant-General Karl Müllner, In-
spector of the Luftwaffe, Newsletter Verteidigung, 
11 September 2012, http://www.newsletter-verteidi-
gung.de/archiv/beitraege/188-interview-mit-general-
leutnant-karl-muellner-inspekteur-der-luftwaffe 
The Bundeswehr will upgrade and buy 
successive elements of the SysFla pro-
ject depending on its financial situation.
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ed by an employee of the Federal Office for 
Arms Technology and Procurement in October 
201215 suggests that the first step could be to 
integrate the MFCR, the BMC4I centre and the 
IRIS-T SL air defence system with the German 
Patriot batteries (although these plans have not 
yet been approved). The second stage could 
consist in the creation of a system with better 
parameters with the integration of a ‘European’ 
missile. Since Franco-German co-operation has 
been mentioned in this context, such a missile 
would probably be developed on the basis of 
the French-Italian Aster-30. German companies 
do not possess any technologies to build mis-
siles capable of intercepting short-range bal-
listic missiles; with regard to air defence, the 
most advanced German surface-to-air system 
is the IRIS-T SL currently under development. 
Therefore Germany has to co-operate with 
foreign partners. MBDA Deutschland, the Ger-
man company participating in the MEADS pro-
gram, has been lobbying for the integration of 
the MEADS elements with the Franco-Italian 
SAMP/T system.16 According to representatives 
of the Bundeswehr and MBDA Deutschland, 
such a system could become the basis for a Eu-
ropean medium-range air and missile defence 
system in the future. There have been no re-
ports of German-French talks on the subject, 
though. Moreover, Franco-German relations 
in this sphere have not been particularly good 
for some time. The reasons for this include 
 
15 Regine Friedberger, Überlegungen zur deutschen Luft-
verteidigungsarchitektur, Europäische Sicherheit & 
Technik, October 2012, p. 70-72.
16 Thomas Homberg, Einstieg in den Luftverteidigungsver-
bund 2020 notwendig und möglich, Politik & Sicherheit, 
November 2012, http://www.politik-sicherheit.de/Ar-
chiv_ab_07/Politik_Sicherheit_Nr19.pdf 
the deepening of Franco-British military and 
technical co-operation, as well as the differ-
ences between Germany and France on military 
crisis management (Libya, Mali, Syria) and arms 
industry issues (most recently, the failed EADS-
BAE merger). However, it is possible that talks 
on possible co-operation between Germany 
and France on a medium-range missile defence 
system will begin after the Bundestag elections 
this autumn. 
Germany and NATO’s ballistic missile 
defence
German Patriot batteries (and their possible 
successors) will become part of NATO’s ballistic 
missile defence, since it was decided that the 
ALTBMD program17 (in which Germany has been 
participating since 2005) will be integrated into 
the NATO system along with the US EPAA ele-
ments in Europe. However, the Patriot batteries 
(and their possible successors) will serve sole-
ly for missile (and air) defence of population 
centres, military and strategic facilities against 
short-range ballistic missiles (up to 1000 km). 
The few publications by German think-tanks 
on the subject, and the conclusions that can 
be drawn on the basis of documents and state-
ments by MoD’s and Bundeswehr officials18, 
suggest that Germany does not rule out ex-
panding its contribution to NATO’s ballistic 
missile defence in the future. The decision 
will depend however on a number of political, 
military and economic factors, and will not be 
taken before early 2014. It is certain, however, 
that the Bundeswehr’s priority will be to build 
the future air and missile defence architecture 
in such a way that new systems, radars and in-
terceptors can be incorporated into it and coor-
dinated under a single command centre. 
17 The aim of the ALTBMD (Active Layered Theatre Ballis-
tic Missile Defence) program was to protect NATO de-
ployed forces against short- and medium-range ballistic 
missile threats (up to 3000 km range).
18 Oliver Thränert, Das Raketenabwehrprojekt der Nato, 
SWP-Studie, September 2011, 
http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/prod-
ucts/studien/2011_S25_trt_ks.pdf; see footnote 3, 14 
and 15. 
Germans assume that they will be able 
to modernise their medium-range air de-
fence using some key elements of the 
MEADS prototype.
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Germany has been considering the follow-
ing options to potentially expand its contri-
bution to NATO’s ballistic missile defence: 
the purchase of the land-based THAAD system, 
modernisation of the F124 Sachsen class frig-
ates, or even the development of a European 
system to intercept ballistic missiles at higher 
altitudes. The US-made THAAD system is de-
signed to provide protection against short- and 
medium-range ballistic missiles (up to 1000 and 
to 3000 km, respectively) within a range of up 
to 200 km and at altitudes of up to 150 km, 
i.e. in the upper strata of the atmosphere (the 
so-called upper tier). It can therefore provide 
missile protection for larger areas than the Pa-
triot or MEADS systems, which intercept mis-
siles in the lower strata of the atmosphere (the 
so-called lower tier).19 For financial reasons, 
the modernisation of the F124 Sachsen class 
frigates (Germany has three such vessels)20 
has so far seemed to be the preferred option 
– such modernisation would consist in upgrad-
ing either the SMART-L radars alone, or the en-
tire missile defence system including the SM-3 
missiles which, depending on the type, would 
be able to intercept short- and medium-range 
missiles (up to 1000 km and up to 3000 km re-
spectively, for the SM-3 Block IB) or medium- 
and intermediate-range missiles (up to 3000 
and 5500 km, for the SM-3 Block IIA). The US 
Aegis BMD-capable ships equipped with SM-3 
interceptors (Block IA for the moment) are al-
ready deployed in the Mediterranean as part 
of the EPAA’s first phase. Land-based SM-3 in-
terceptors are to be deployed in Romania (by 
2015; SM-3 Block IB) and in Poland (by 2018; 
 
19 Tomasz Kwasek, System przeciwrakietowy THAAD, 
Dziennik Zbrojny, 25 January 2013,
http://dziennikzbrojny.pl/artykuly/art,5,22,3262,wo-
j s k a - l a d o w e , b r o n - r a k i e t o w a , s y s t e m - p r z e c i -
wrakietowy-thaad 
20 The main task of the F124 Sachsen class frigates is to 
provide air defence while escorting warships and com-
mercial vessels, and to provide local protection for coast-
al areas; currently they are equipped with SM-2 missiles.
SM-3 Block IIA). According to an employee of 
the Federal Office for Arms Technology and 
Procurement, the option of creating a Europe-
an system (in Franco-German cooperation) to 
intercept ballistic missiles in the upper strata of 
the atmosphere is also being considered. 
The final decision on further German in-
volvement in NATO’s ballistic missile defence 
has not yet been taken. It will probably be 
left for the next government to resolve, 
and the outcome will depend on political, 
military and financial factors. For now, the 
German government seems to have adopted 
a ‘wait and see’ approach, and to be watching 
the implementation of the US EPAA program 
as well as the plans of the other allies. The de-
cision to step up German involvement will de-
pend on whether Germany feels threatened by 
attacks using medium- and intermediate-range 
ballistic missiles. The plans of other European 
NATO members as well as changes in the atti-
tude of Russia, will also be important. Finally, 
Berlin’s decision will also be influenced by fi-
nancial considerations. The cost of buying or 
developing the systems in question are very 
high, and will be acceptable to Germany only if 
they are shared in a co-operative arrangement 
by several European countries. 
The final decision on further German in-
volvement in NATO’s ballistic missile de-
fence will depend on political, military 
and financial factors. 
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MEADS Program
The United States, Germany and Italy started 
developing the MEADS medium-range air and 
missile defence system (Medium Extended Air 
Defense System) in 2005, financing 58%, 25% 
and 17% of the project costs, respectively. 
MEADS International is a joint venture estab-
lished by the US Lockheed Martin, Germany’s 
LFK GmbH/MBDA Deutschland and Italy’s Alenia 
Marconi Systems/MBDA Italia. The MEADS sys-
tem was intended to counter aircraft, helicop-
ters, UAVs and cruise missiles, as well as short-
range (up to 1000 km) ballistic missiles carrying 
conventional and unconventional warheads 
as part of the defence of the national territory 
and the protection of deployed forces (no infor-
mation is available on the system’s exact range). 
The system was supposed to offer better capa-
bility to detect targets and offer 360-degree 
defence capability, a feature that the Patriot 
system does not offer. It was also intended to 
offer greater interoperability and compatibili-
ty with other systems, meaning both systems 
held by other allies and other systems within 
Germany’s national air defence architecture. 
The MEADS system was also supposed to be 
more mobile, i.e. to offer better capability to 
move in the field and be easier to airlift (using 
A400M or C-160 Transall transport aircraft or 
CH-53 helicopter as an externally-mounted load).
Components of the MEADS system: 
• Multifunction Fire Control Radar (MFCR) op-
erating in the X-band and equipped with 
an active electronically scanned array anten-
na (AESA);
• Surveillance Radar;
• Battle Management, Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers and Intelligence 
(BMC4I) Tactical Operation Center;
• Launcher and reloader with 360-degree cov-
erage (for eight PAC-3 MSE missiles);
• PAC-3 MSE missile manufactured by the US-
based Lockheed Martin; it counters aircraft, 
helicopters, UAV’s, cruise missiles and short-
range ballistic missiles;
• IRIS-T SL, a medium-range air defence system 
developed by Germany’s Diehl BGT Defence. 
It was supposed to supplement the German 
version of the MEADS system to reduce the 
cost of operating the MEADS batteries with 
the expensive PAC-3 MSE missiles. IRIS-T SL 
was supposed to counter less demanding tar-
gets – aircraft, helicopters, UAVs and air-to-
surface missiles within a range of 25 km21.
21 Diehl Defence, IRIS-T Guided Missile Family, IRIS-T SL, 
http://www.diehl.com/en/diehl-defence/products/guid-
ed-missiles/iris-t-guided-missile-family/iris-t-sl.html 
APPENDIX
